Eliminating Independent Agencies in Mexico: “Don’t Throw the Baby Out With the Bathwater”

Jose Francisco Lara contributed to this piece.

Imagine that a populist tried to eliminate independent agencies such as the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the Federal Election Commission or the Securities and Exchange Commission. Even though it does not seem likely, that is what is happening in Mexico.

With the arrival of Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) to the Mexican presidency in 2018, an open conflict between autonomous constitutional bodies (OCA, their acronym in Spanish), a group of technical and regulatory independent agencies, and the government began. The issue was recently raised during AMLO’s morning conferences, the government’s primary communication tool. On January 7th, the president called OCAs costly and non-beneficial to the people, and announced he has the intention of modifying the law to make them disappear. While the results of these institutions are far from perfect, we believe that a more feasible approach to this issue would be to focus on reform, rather than elimination.

The OCAs were established in Mexico in recent decades as checks and balances for the government. By the end of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional’s 70-year authoritarian regime, general lack of trust in the government caused social discontent and pressure to create institutions that were not vulnerable to partisan influence and short-sighted politics. The abuse of power of the governing party led to depreciation of the national currency and the eventual establishment of the Central Bank (Banxico). Constant electoral frauds opened onto the creation of the electoral institute (IFE, now INE), while human rights violations by public officials that went unpunished gave rise to an independent human rights commission (CNDH). Nowadays, OCAs serve to protect rights such as freedom of expression and public information. Likewise, they regulate critical sectors such as telecom and economic competition. In summary, they are a product of social struggles that strengthen democracy.

Contrary to the president’s “alternative facts”, OCAs are not expensive, and far from serving private interests, they have had positive results for the Mexican population. By way of example, an evaluation report from 2020 states that the Commission on Economic Competitiveness (COFECE), through regulation and the combat of monopolies, generated benefits to Mexico of almost four billion pesos, which is equivalent to 6.76 times its budget. According to Government’s official records, the OCAs’ expenses accounted for 34 billion pesos, while public expenditures of Petróleos Mexicanos and the National Electric Commission, inefficient government enterprises focused on fossil fuel, were 25 times higher.

Furthermore, in the context of AMLO’s presidency, the most powerful government in the last 30 years given their popular support (over 30 million votes) and legislative majority in both cameras and its influence on the judiciary, the independence of the OCAs satisfies another fundamental purpose: acting as checks and balances to concentration of power. Given the lack of a professionalized public service, bureaucratic oversight has yet to be achieved in Mexico. Similarly, the electoral system has proved to be ineffective to maintain populist leaderships like AMLO, who have a record of going against institutions and checks and balances, out of power. In 2006, after losing his first presidential bid, AMLO said that “(Mexican) public agencies should go to hell”. In this sense, OCAs serve as a de facto restraint to power abuse and as mechanisms of oversight for not only single bureaucrats but the government as a whole.

While it is true that OCAs’ independence has fostered some political accountability issues, given that experts are not elected officials whose performance cannot be rewarded or punished by citizens, we believe is not recommendable to modify the way that these experts are currently appointed. We believe that the OCAs’ current structure serves to separate electoral and strategic decisions, such as monetary, energy or electoral policies. Consequently, this could make it more difficult for shortsighted politicians to modify such policies irresponsibly or discretionally.

Of course, in an ideal world where all political actors played a fair game, there was not public corruption or inefficiencies, human rights were protected and guaranteed, and political decisions were separated from policy when needed, the OCAs could and should be eliminated. However, that is not the way this cookie crumbles. That said, the ongoing conflict between AMLO and the OCAs can still be positive, if it starts a public conversation around what the OCAs have achieved, what are their unfulfilled promises, and alternatives for improvement. Before entertaining measures such as their disappearance, we should thoroughly reflect on the wide benefits that these institutions bring to the Mexican Democracy and think about how to correct their shortcoming instead. In other words, we must be wary of “not throwing the baby out with the bath water”.